What tactical system can we expect from Manchester City next season (2023-24)?
Analyzing Pep's pragmatism, the rise of John Stones, City's summer transfer activity, and projecting what it all means for the club moving forward
CONTENTS
introduction
context
Pep’s Pragmatic Dominance
The Rise of John Stones
tactics
Cruyff’s 3-4-3 Diamond
The Importance of Counterweight Relationships
analysis
Josko Gvardiol
Mateo Kovacic
Declan Rice
Gabri Veiga, Phil Foden, and the Gundogan Dilemma
projection
Man City’s Potential 2023-24 Tactical System(s)
First Choice
General Rotation
Mass Rotation
Last edited: June 29, 2023 @ 11:24 pm EDT
[0. introduction]
At the end of the 2022-23 season and the advent of the 2023 summer transfer window, Pep Guardiola left those in power with three transfer targets: Mateo Kovacic, Josko Gvardiol, and Declan Rice.
As of the day this article is published (Friday, June 30), Kovacic has been unveiled as a City player and Gvardiol seems to be on the way, but City have backed out of the race for Rice, who will joining Arsenal.
Even though City are only signing two of the three, Pep’s selection of these specific players provides us with key insight into how City will look to set up next season. Along with the departure of Ilkay Gundogan, potential departure of several other key figures, and positional changes for figures like Phil Foden, this summer is on the verge of becoming a season of widespread change for City.
To understand what this means, we have to look back and observe how the relationships of City’s treble-winning side evolved, develop an understanding of emergent key ideas, and dissect where Pep’s three targets fit in.
[1. context]
PEP’S PRAGMATIC DOMINANCE
At the turn of the 2022-23 Premier League season, just after the World Cup, Pep Guardiola implemented a new tactical system at Manchester City. Seemingly at a whim, the new system pushed Joao Cancelo to the bench in favor of 18-year-old Rico Lewis – a player and role which moved me to the point of writing my first long-form article.
Cancelo was benched multiple games in a row, after he had been a first-choice starter at City for almost two years. As a result, he acted despondently, fell out with Pep, and was subsequently loaned for the remainder of the season to Bayern Munich.
This transformation, signaled by the integration of Rico Lewis and the departure of Joao Cancelo, marks a paradigm shift in City’s tactical ideology.
Crucially, the new tactical system offered City a slightly different backline structure, in possession.
Before, in the build-up system City primarily deployed for the first six-and-a-half seasons of Pep’s tenure, the two full-backs would push forward to align horizontally with defensive midfielder Rodri, creating a 2-3 structure, or “W.”
Now, one of the full-backs (or center-backs, at times) pushes forward alongside Rodri, and the opposite full-back drops alongside the two remaining defenders, creating a 3-2 structure, or “M.”
In midfield, this dynamic creates a box behind the striker (as opposed to a diamond with the striker at the tip), with the half space attacking midfielders operating slightly narrower than before.
There are certainly many reasons Pep shifted from a 2-3 build-up structure to a 3-2 – including greater support to and better attacking angles behind superstar striker Erling Haaland, along with greater superiority in midfield. Yet, the most important driving force behind this shift, in my opinion, is the defensive capabilities of the “M” shape in transition.
For years, the previous “W” shape proved a weakness when City’s opposition could get in behind one (or both) of the advanced full-backs. In certain moments, the full-backs flanking the 2-3 structure would join the attacking-five, leaving only four men behind the ball.
If the opposition could win the ball back and transition through City’s immediate high-press, City would be caught out; left fending off danger with three or four defenders against two to four attackers.
The “M” shape, on the other hand, is a bit more cautious. Most often, in possession, the shape remains stable, with the front-four behind Haaland engaging in fluid attacking movements.
When one of the back-five does choose to engage, they are likely to be met with a counterweight (such as Jack Grealish dropping deep if Nathan Ake overlaps on the left, or Ilkay Gundogan dropping deep if one of Rodri or John Stones make a forward run).
The main idea being: with a 3-2 build-up structure, City’s opposition must always face a structurally solid back-five if they want a chance of scoring. It’s an extremely pragmatic idea that Pep himself has identified as a turning point for City’s dominance.
With the 3-2 build-up structure, in the moments the opposition win the ball back and beat the first wave of City’s press, the largest remaining spaces are out wide, ahead of City’s wide center-back, rather than in behind.
City’s aim in these scenarios is what I call a “riptide effect.”
City’s wide center-back (along with the same-sided defensive midfielder) channel the flow of the opposition’s attack out wide. This forces the opposition to play backwards, into less dangerous areas, stagnating a potential counter-attack and allowing City to reset into a defensively secure out-of-possession (OOP) structure (often a 4-4-2 mid-block). If City wins the ball back in the process, it’s a cherry on top.
Along with the tactical unicorns that are the inverted full-backs (Lewis/Stones), you need excellent one-versus-one defenders throughout the back-three to make this system run smoothly. Otherwise, the riptide effect is undermined. If the opposition winger can successfully take-on City’s wide center-back, City are faced with the same transitional issues as before.
"You cannot play 80, 90 minutes, or try to play a lot of minutes, and be open in that way... conceding every time you lose the ball and make a transition. That would be silly. But now the defense is: [Manuel] Akanji is a proper defender, John Stones is obviously incredibly focused, Kyle [Walker] has the ability to control the most dangerous wingers in the world... we have Nathan Ake in the duels, one-against-one… Be a good defender, I consider it the biggest talent in football… and now we have players who enjoy defending." - Pep Guardiola in a June 2023 interview with Thierry Henry
While the fascinating inverted double pivot role has received the majority of plaudits (rightfully so), the role of the wide center-backs in this system must be lauded, as well.
Manuel Akanji and Nathan Ake both produced monumental campaigns, blossoming into this role in the second half of the season. The former played the most minutes of any City defender over the entirety of the season (after costing around £15 million), and the latter finished in the top three for the “Etihad Player of the Season” award. Without pure defenders of their caliber, City would never have been able to reach the heights of dominance they achieved this past season.
When we look back at City’s backline just a season ago, the technically focused full-back pairing of Oleksandr Zinchenko and Joao Cancelo is a night and day difference compared to a system including two of Akanji, Ake, and Walker out wide.
The emergence of the 3-2 build-up structure with a defense-oriented backline is a change emblematic of Pep’s pragmatic dominance, and something we will see continually develop throughout the 2023-24 season.
For a more detailed and historically rooted perspective on Pep’s recent development of the 3-2-2-3, check out this wonderful article – “How Guardiola & 3-2-2-3 (ultimately) solved the defending meta” – from tactically-focused site spielverlagerung.com.
As City’s 3-2 structure has become a point of global fixation, it’s important to understand how we got to this point. With the abundance of tactical minds attempting to emulate a similar tactical system (professionals and amateurs alike), the 3-2-4-1 has become a sort of status symbol, a cultural trend of modern football.
Yet, when a tactical idea as complex as this gets reduced to a series of numbers or a graphic made with a shoddy lineup app, it reduces the tactical realities to a superficial representation. Under Pep, this system has been anything but rigid.
Instead of looking at the system as a singular formation, it’s more important to understand the system as a set of relationships, observing how those relationships develop over time.
For that, let’s go back to the beginning of the 3-2 structure at City…
THE RISE OF JOHN STONES
At the time the 3-2 structure was first implemented, Ruben Dias was injured. This meant when Akanji took over his natural place at the center of the back-three, the right center-back role was vacant for one of Stones or Walker to fill. In the first few games, Pep opted for Stones in this spot, with Lewis occupying the inverted role.
Stones was soon tested as the central center-back, then pushed back out wide before picking up a hamstring injury in late January 2023, against Arsenal.
In the absence of Stones, Lewis continued to occupy the inverted full-back role. In a few games, Pep utilized Bernardo Silva in the double pivot as a faux-left-back, and in a few other games, Pep reverted to the 2-3 build-up.
It wasn’t until nine games later Stones returned, and when he did, he grabbed the inverted role by the horns.
In a span of under two months, Stones developed from (already) one of the best center-backs in the world into a defender also capable of playing an in-possession double pivot midfield role (at the most elite level, mind you). The transition quite frankly shocked the footballing world, once they realized what was going on. For most, it felt like it happened in the blink of an eye.
Among other accolades, this role saw Stones be named to the Champions League (UCL) Team of the Season as a midfielder, rather than a defender.
In the UCL final against Inter Milan, he completed the most successful dribbles (6) of any player in a UCL final since Messi (10), in 2015. A staggering individual benchmark that shows both his technical ability in midfield and the liberties through which he is able to express that in this version of Pep’s City.
Opta Sports defines a dribble as “an attempt by a player to beat an opponent when they have possession of the ball. A successful dribble means the player beats the defender while retaining possession, unsuccessful ones are where the dribbler is tackled.”
Yet, caught up in the clamor of City’s run-in is just how much Stones’ midfield role has continued to progress, even through the final few (and most important) games of the season.
If we look back, we can see two subtle shifts revolving around Stones’ inverted role occurred – one shift in the first leg UCL semifinal, against Real Madrid (May 9, 2023), and another shift in the FA Cup final (June 3, 2023), against Manchester United.
In both legs against Real Madrid, Gundogan (#8) dropped deeper than usual, playing almost horizontal to Rodri (#16) and Stones (#5) (counterbalanced by Kevin De Bruyne (#17) playing alongside Haaland (#9) in the frontline). This change formed a staggered 3-4-3, in Leg 1, and a 3-3-4, in Leg 2; the latter of which saw City suffocate Real in their defensive third, and play them off the park.
In the FA Cup final, Pep once again tweaked the system, pushing Stones even further up the pitch, almost as a full-on mezzala at times. Compared to the structure against Real, the structure against Man United (pictured above) is more optimal. The spacing is more even, all-around, and it generally follows basic principles of positional play (ideally no more than three players in a horizontal plane or two players in a vertical plane).
In the UCL final, the City structure was relatively collapsed once again – almost with three horizontal lines, rather than a diamond-based structure. Stones played somewhere in between the roles of the previous two highlighted games, selectively choosing his moments to advance into dangerous half space positions – with much greater liberty than he displayed in the first few months of occupying this role.
With each game throughout the run-in of the season, “the Barnsley Beckenbauer” improved stride after stride, eventually culminating in a historical crescendo. The tactical flexibility Pep was afforded to secure the most important games of City’s season is in large part a result of Stones’ much-improved offensive game.
As we move into the 2023-24 season, one can only assume both John Stones and Rico Lewis will continue to develop their ability in this role, affording Pep the option to play them higher and higher up the pitch.
With that flexibility comes an idea steeped in Pep Guardiola’s footballing foundation – the 3-4-3 diamond of Johan Cruyff.
[2. tactics]
CRUYFF’S 3-4-3 DIAMOND
Johan Cruyff’s influence on Pep Guardiola is well-known, it’s a relationship that needs very little introduction in the footballing world – Cruyff’s tutelage of Pep formed the crux of the latter’s perspective on football and management.
In the final stretch of City’s 2023-24 season, primarily thanks to the development of Stones’ ball-playing ability, Guardiola reignited an iteration of a specific Cruyff-ian system (one Guardiola had also famously deployed throughout his managerial stint at Barcelona) – the 3-4-3 diamond. The central idea of this 3-4-3 is to maintain the correct (diamond) structure in midfield while simultaneously adapting to a world class striker; without losing superiority in the wide areas.
As Cruyff explains in a famous clip (linked above), the classically favored 4-1-2-1-2 diamond has a weakness when the outside midfielders get pulled out of their zones to deal with the opposition full-back. If that happens, you lose the structure of the diamond in midfield and you lose a body crucial to the idea of “finding the third man.” Similarly, with the more modern 4-2-3-1, if the wide players lose the ball, the midfielders in the double pivot will be left to play one versus one, stretching the defensive shape and creating weaknesses.
When Cruyff encountered the 3-4-3 diamond in the 1970’s, during his time as a player at Ajax, Ruud Krol would sub on and invert into midfield from the left-back position. What this did is retain the attacking-four of the 4-2-3-1 without sacrificing the extra man in midfield. The three in defense would shift wider, together monitoring the opposition’s two center-forwards, and a diamond in midfield would form. This system maintained the structural integrity in midfield to support the core ideas of Cruyff’s positional ideologies, but it came without the transitional deficiencies of the 4-1-2-1-2 or 4-2-3-1.
As a manager, Cruyff deployed this idea extremely often. Perhaps most well-known is his use of it at Barcelona, with none other than Pep as the defensive midfielder, at the base of the diamond. Fast forward to Pep’s managerial career and we see variations of this idea arise all over his 14 seasons of top-level experience.
Yet, at City, as displayed in the graphic below (courtesy of The Athletic), Pep hasn’t tinkered with this idea much at City. Not nearly as much as he did in his shorter stints at Barcelona and Bayern Munich.
Until recently, City’s tactical system has remained relatively consistent. However, after six-and-a-half seasons, Pep felt a need for a change – and it resulted in a treble.
Perhaps, Pep was planning for this all along. Perhaps, the moment struck like lightning and Pep caught it in a bottle.
The ideas of City’s 3-2-4-1 aren’t congruent to the ideas of Cruyff’s 3-4-3 diamond, most notably, the four midfielders form a (skewed) box midfield rather than a diamond midfield, yet they share a majority of the same fundamental principles.
Between December, 2022 and June, 2023, Pep and City did dip their toes into the 3-4-3 diamond. Markedly, in the early games with Lewis and the later games with Stones. However, it most often operated as a lopsided diamond with a frontline of four (closer to a 3-3-4) rather than a true 3-4-3 diamond.
Given City’s recent pragmatism of keeping five behind the ball at all times, the 3-4-3 diamond can prove difficult to execute. The two half space midfielders (with Rodri in the middle) need to act like a Newton’s cradle – whenever one pushes up, the other drops deep. A near perfect synchronicity is required, which necessitates an outfit of players with an exceptional reading of the game. When done correctly, however, the 3-4-3 diamond offers a balanced attacking onslaught the 3-2-4-1 often lacks.
Against a team of lesser quality, such as Leeds and Southampton (shown in the examples above), or against a team playing a low-block, you can afford to throw six men into the attack (and in this way, make some mistakes). However, in the big games against greater opposition, especially those who are ruthless on the counter, the smallest of mistakes can be costly.
As City’s squad continue to develop their understanding of these ideas and new players with the qualities to excel in a 3-4-3 diamond are introduced (*cough cough* Kovacic), Pep will be afforded more and more flexibility to explore iterations of this idea. Soon, he should be able to demand a 3-box-3 or a 3-diamond-3 on a whim.
Crucial to City reaching that point, including the board’s facilitation of that goal this summer, is the balancing of specific counterweight relationships within the squad.
THE IMPORTANCE OF COUNTERWEIGHT RELATIONSHIPS
The subtleties between a box midfield and a diamond midfield, for me, are best expressed through the dynamics of player profiles in specific counterweight relationships – the “Newton’s cradle” midfield being the prime example.
When Stones first integrated into this new role, you had Ilkay Gundogan on the opposite side of Rodri to him. On the principle of ideally having a solid structure of five behind the ball – if Stones pushes forward, it means Gundogan must drop back to compensate. In a defensively pragmatic system all about finding the third or fourth man in possession, counterweight relationships are absolutely crucial.
Luckily for Stones’ development, Gundogan’s reading of the game is about as good as they come – Gundogan’s role as the counterweight to the inverter is just one of the many ways he quietly facilitated City’s treble-winning run. More importantly, the development of Gundogan and Stones’ relationship displays the range of a critical counterweight relationship.
Back in March, one reason it was more advantageous for City to use a box midfield is it was best suited to the dynamic between Gundogan and Stones – the better attacker was positioned higher up and the better defender was positioned further back. Their roles were slightly simpler than if they were to play with a true counterweight relationship and down to the football IQ of Gundogan, whenever Stones did opt to rotate forward, he could read that and counterbalance it.
Once Stones improved (both mentally and technically) and the overall knowledge of the squad grew, Guardiola had the option to push Stones further forward, into a diamond rather than a box.
As a knock-on effect, this allowed De Bruyne to play around Haaland as he would like, rather than sticking to the right half space. A change which benefited City down the stretch because it offered (an injured) De Bruyne greater flexibility to exploit the spaces Haaland’s presence leaves vacant, while reducing his defensive responsibilities.
Not only is the counterweight relationship between the two midfielders flanking Rodri important, but the relationship between that pairing and the advanced attacking midfielder is crucial, as well.
With Haaland and Rodri as constants, Pep can mold his midfield shape around the profiles at his disposal. While the box midfield best suited City’s outfit last season, the further integration of Phil Foden and Julian Alvarez into midfield (considering De Bruyne’s injury and decreasing mobility) suggests to me a diamond shape better suits City’s 2023-24 outfit.
While both of those players have displayed their ability to operate in the half space attacking midfield positions of City’s 3-2-4-1, one would think their profiles are better suited to playing a more fluid second striker role – liberating them of some defensive responsibilities to allow for their capacity for attacking output to increase.
With the departure of Ilkay Gundogan, the development of John Stones, and the midfield integration of Phil Foden, City look primed to shift closer towards a 3-4-3 diamond. To do so, however, the club needs the right summer window to nurture such a change.
When we look at the three players Pep requested the board to pursue (Gvardiol, Kovacic, and Rice), this initiative becomes clearer.
Allow me to explain why…
[3. analysis]
JOSKO GVARDIOL
Let’s start with the first of City’s two (near-guaranteed) signings this summer: the 21-year-old left-footed Croatian defender from RB Leipzig who is bound to become the most expensive defender ever. Listed at 6’1” (185 cm) and 176 lbs (80 kg), Gvardiol fits right into City’s mammoth backline.
Unlike Laporte, who fell out of favor with City’s new system due to his lack of defensive engagement (despite his elite ball-playing ability), Gvardiol is a defender who will not shy away from engaging in defensive actions. Similar to Ruben Dias, Gvardiol is accustomed to stepping up to an opposition attacker, riding their shoulder, then putting in a tackle to dispossess them of the ball.
When Pep talks about wanting players who “enjoy defending,” Josko Gvardiol fits right in.
When Gvardiol needs to, he can use his quick feet and agility to face up the attacker, stifling their forward progress to allow his teammates time to recover. If the opposition try to play in behind, he has the pace to match most attackers. If he is worse off for pace in any given scenario, he has the ability to recover at the right angle and make the right lunging tackle to fulfill his defensive duty (again, similar to Dias).
Out of possession, he can pretty much do it all. He does have some flaws, such as a lack of aerial dominance and a tendency to jump his line, but his ability as a pure defender is about as good as they come – and very well suited to the wide left center-back role in a 3-2 build-up structure.
Many City fans have questioned why the club needs to spend so much on Gvardiol when Ake is already available, especially when it looks like they’ll be competing for the same spot on the left side of defense. After the campaign Ake just produced, it’d be a curious decision to drop him from the first-choice lineup. Of course, City need depth given the mass amount of games they play, but why not buy a cheaper alternative to Ake?
The answer is about attacking potential and tactical flexibility; because as good as Gvardiol is out of possession, his true potential comes from his abilities on the ball.
Unlike the right side of City’s defense, with four primary options of Akanji, Lewis, Stones, and Walker (assuming Dias is playing centrally), the left side of City’s defense is rather barren. This dynamic led to Akanji, Bernardo, and Lewis all deputizing at left-back at some point last season – none of whom are left-footed. If Laporte departs, Ake will be the only left-footed defender at City, until Gvardiol joins.
As much as Ake is an elite defender, he lacks the ability to truly get involved in City’s attacking sequences. When he does, he most often plays as peripheral or supportive of a role as possible. Across last season, the attacking patterns of the Grealish-Gundogan-Ake triangle were sometimes a bit monotonous, or stale. In terms of tactical flexibility, only having ball-playing defenders on the right side is too predictable. That’s exactly where the demand for Gvardiol comes in.
Ake’s defensive qualities may be better than Gvardiol’s, at this time, but there’s a big gap between the on-ball qualities of the two.
If you are to maintain City’s 3-2-4-1 system and substitute Gvardiol for Ake, you now have a player who is willing to take more risk in the attack (sometimes taking too much risk, a deficiency which will soon be coached out of him). You have a player with greater agility on the ball, who is more comfortable at engaging with defenders in small spaces. You have a player who, when playing off of Grealish on the left side in the attacking third, is capable of testing the goalkeeper with a shot from 15 to 25 yards out. For City’s fluid attacking patterns, Gvardiol is a dream addition.
While it may appear that Gvardiol and Ake are battling it out for one spot, I can assure you that’s not exactly the case.
What I find most scary about Gvardiol’s prospects are the potential roles he can take up from the left side. As I noted before, tactical flexibility across the backline will be key for Pep moving forward, and Gvardiol (with time) will offer that in abundance.
Eventually, he will be able to deputize for Dias in the center of an in-possession back-three (allowing Ake to play on the left). Eventually, he will be able to play the inverted role of Lewis and Stones. Eventually, he may even be good enough on the ball to play as City’s fifth attacker.
With Gvardiol, the possibilities seem endless.
Soon enough, the footballing world will understand exactly why Pep and City decided to splash the cash on him.
MATEO KOVACIC
Next, let’s talk about the other Croatian, who has already been unveiled as an official City player: the 29-year-old right-footed central midfielder from Chelsea. With the departure of Gundogan, Kovacic helps to fill the void in City’s left half space.
What must first be noted about Kovacic are the intangibles: he’s a serial winner (a key figure in Chelsea and Croatia’s recent successes and a secondary figure in Madrid’s UCL three-peat), he speaks five languages (including Spanish), and he is extremely adaptable when it comes to taking on various midfield roles (though he is partial to the left side of midfield).
On the pitch, he is agile, with long legs, and presses incredibly well. His tackling and ability to track back are also exceptional. All qualities that make him a perfect fit for a side which attempts to quickly win the ball back after being dispossessed.
On the ball, he is an exceptional ball carrier, able to progress through the lines with the ball at his feet. He is adept at shielding the ball with his lanky frame, drawing fouls when necessary.
The main concern with Kovacic is his attacking ability. His passing range, finishing, and ability to find the right space are nowhere near the ability of his predecessor, Gundogan. He’s better utilized as a facilitator, not someone to produce the end product of an attack.
Unlike Gvardiol, who fits perfectly into the left center-back role in the 3-2-4-1, fitting Kovacic directly into the “Gundogan role” is less reliable.
Ideally, if City are to stick with the 3-2-4-1 in possession, you want Kovacic in the double pivot next to Rodri. At Chelsea, Kovacic often excelled from the very same role, next to Kante. Kovacic is an ideal partner for someone like Rodri because his reading of the game coupled with his defensive capabilities would allow Rodri to join the attack more often.
The issue with that is, if City wish to play a double pivot of Kovacic and Rodri but still drop into a four-at-the-back structure out of possession, either one of them needs to drop into the backline or someone like Gvardiol needs to act as City’s fifth attacker. None of that is out of the question, but it would certainly undermine the balance Pep struck with Stones in the inverted role.
With all this in mind, there’s a solution that best fits everything together: you guessed it, the 3-4-3 diamond.
The crucial dynamic of the 3-4-3 diamond discussed earlier returns: counterweight relationships. Unlike the gulf in attacking quality between Gundogan and Stones at the advent of City’s 3-4-2-1, the gap in attacking quality between Kovacic and Stones is negligible. In fact, they strangely have very similar attacking profiles.
Neither are very reliable at creating output, but they are exceptional at facilitating the output of others. With an attacking midfield position likely to be occupied at all times by either De Bruyne, Foden, or Alvarez, it makes sense to permit that player as much freedom as possible.
With a midfield of Kovacic-Rodri-Stones, City’s front four would be afforded a greater level of positional freedom. At any time, often triggered by the actions of the attacking midfielder ahead, one of Kovacic or Stones would join the attack as the fifth man, while the other sits back in a double pivot alongside Rodri – like a flexible 3-4-2-1.
Out of possession, this system allows Pep his stocky, four center-back backline, along with an ultra-solid midfield pairing of Kovacic and Rodri.
On the left side, Kovacic’s ability to recover allows Gvardiol more agency to initiate attacking patterns; once again, aiding the issue of City’s monotonous left-sided triangle. A left-sided trio of Grealish-Kovacic-Gvardiol is a set of players who can all receive from deep-lying areas and penetrate the opposition’s lines with the ball at their feet.
Whether Pep can develop Kovacic into a more dynamic role is, of course, yet to be seen. A player of Kovacic’s mental and technical ability, I wouldn’t put it past the pair to conjure something few of us expect. However, at this time, the left-sided #8 role in a 3-4-3 diamond is where I see Kovacic fitting best at City.
DECLAN RICE
With Rice off to Arsenal for a fee of £100 million, you may think it’s redundant to analyze where he would’ve fit in at City. However, for me, there’s value in understanding why Pep would list Rice as one of three primary transfer targets – especially when City already have Rodri.
It’s worth noting, there’s a potential City’s interest in Rice was only to provide competition to Arsenal, driving the price up and limiting their spending ability for the rest of the summer window. However, I struggle to believe that was City’s sole motive – I think Pep had strong plans if the club were to land Rice’s signature. We’ll likely never know the extent of City’s interest, but for the sake of argument, let’s assume there was a tactical impetus behind that interest.
Now, very little needs to be said about Rice’s abilities. There’s a reason two of the most progressive projects in England are willing to pay in the ballpark of £100 million.
At the same time, many see Rice only as a true defensive midfielder. If you asked those people where to fit Rice in this City team, many would say alongside or in place of Rodri. Yet, if you play him in a double pivot with Rodri, you face the same issue as you did with Kovacic (an unfavorable out of possession XI lacking the proper number of defenders).
This begs the question: "where would Pep have planned to play Rice at City?”
The short answer: almost everywhere.
With a player of his combined ability and mentality (not to mention his leadership skills), at the age of 24, he is primed for some of the biggest years of his career. At West Ham and with England, he has shown he can play multiple midfield positions at an elite level: as a single defensive midfielder, in a double pivot, as a left sided #8. The only thing seemingly stopping Rice’s growth is the management he’s developed by (at Arsenal, under Mikel Arteta, you would expect him to flourish).
Ideally, Rice is played as a #6 or a #8, perfect for the in-possession double pivot role at both City and Arsenal, or the left-sided “Xhaka role” at Arsenal.
Yet, you can also use him across most spots in the midfield and backline, if need be. One of his most important qualities is his ability to set the tempo of a team from the backline in possession – something Bernardo has done at crucial moments for City. Both players have the ability to receive the ball, stall play for the right amount of time, then make the correct decision to best facilitate the team’s attacking sequence.
At City, Rice would have likely best served Pep in a similar manner to Bernardo, as a “tactical Swiss Army knife,” as I typically refer to the latter – meaning, he can play almost wherever Pep needs him in a given game. Like Gvardiol and Kovacic, Rice would aid City’s flexibility on the left side.
If Rice were to be bedded-in at a specific role in this City side, I once again think the 3-4-3 diamond would have been the best fit. For the same reasons as Kovacic, a left-sided #6/#8-hybrid role would allow Rice’s reading of the game to flourish, while also strengthening the out-of-possession structure – adding a 6’1” (185 cm) figure to an already tall back-six.
With Pep seemingly on a quest for a pragmatic base of six defenders with three creators feeding Haaland, Rice would have fit right into the plan, being one of the best signings in the world City could have made.
Again, who knows to what degree City’s interest in Rice was palpable; though if we believe it to be, it would be another indication of a transition towards a 3-4-3 diamond.
GABRI VEIGA, PHIL FODEN, AND THE GUNDOGAN DILEMMA
As noted earlier, with the departure of Gundogan, City are losing a player crucial to operating the 3-2-4-1 formation. To underscore how important Gundogan is to the 3-2-4-1, City will likely have ten (10!) players who can play in that role (De Bruyne, Bernardo, Kovacic, Grealish, Foden, Alvarez, Oscar Bobb, Maximo Perrone, Sergio Gomez, and (likely to be recalled) James McAtee), but none of them who are ready for the top level have the all-around skillset to play the role exactly like the German did.
Gundogan acted as a sort of stabilizer, a chameleon. He has the ability to morph his game around whatever system you put around him. If you want him to sit as a deep-lying tempo-setter, he will control the game from the #6 position. If you want him to poach goals, he will find the right spaces as a #9. If you want him to read when and where to do both of those, and everything in between, he will do that.
Out of possession, Gundogan’s combination of spatial dominance, reading of the game, and work rate make him much better suited to dropping into a midfield two than any of City’s current options, except for Bernardo and Kovacic who lack the potent box presence Gundogan also possessed.
The situation leaves City with a major dilemma, which raises a question of why there wasn’t a more concerted effort to meet Gundogan’s demands and keep him at the club.
In short, the attacking and defensive profiles that make up City’s key midfield counterweight relationships are drifting further and further apart. The squad has potent attacking options, brilliant facilitators, and impervious defensive options, but no player who can do all three at once. With Gundogan’s departure, Pep and City will have to find balance in other ways.
Given the context, as things stand, City have two primary means to achieve that goal: sign a player of the right profile or tactically adapt to better suit the squad’s personnel.
Here is the apparent plan in each scenario…
After the conclusion of the Declan Rice saga, Fabrizio Romano almost immediately reported that City had entered the race to sign one of the emergent midfield talents in European football: Celta Vigo’s Gabri Veiga.
For those who may be unfamiliar with Veiga, he is a 21-year-old right-footed attacking midfielder with 11 goals and 4 assists in Celta Vigo’s 2022-23 La Liga campaign, helping his boyhood club stave off relegation and finish in 13th place.
Now, it must be said, Rice and Veiga are two very, very different players – Veiga is by no means a like-for-like secondary target. However, even though I have been harping on about a transition to a 3-4-3 diamond, the difference between the two transfer targets signals a versatility that is crucial to City’s plans.
Without a suitable like-for-like alternative for Gundogan on the market (as very few, if any, exist), City’s interest in Veiga marks a more nuanced approach to filling the German’s void. That approach: replace Gundogan with two midfielders, one experienced, defensive-minded midfielder and one high-ceiling, attack-minded midfielder.
The idea being, the first midfielder allows Pep to field a more pragmatic XI, ideally for crucial games in which the aim is to exert all-around dominance, and the second midfielder allows Pep to experiment with a new, Gundogan-like, profile.
City have already signed Kovacic, who fulfills the defensive-minded aspect of the role, so it now becomes a matter of signing an (ideally young) attacking midfielder with high-level technical ability and the ceiling to grow into an all-around gem of a midfielder – almost a perfect description of Veiga.
This past season at Celta Vigo, Veiga has most often played as an advanced right-sided center midfielder in a 4-3-3 or 4-4-2. Veiga also has some experience playing on the right flank, offering a similar versatility to Bernardo’s role at City.
Across the 2022-23 campaign, Veiga displayed two stand-out qualities: goal-scoring threat and ball-carrying ability. Similar to Gundogan’s late-arriver role at City, Veiga thrives crashing through the opposition’s lines to arrive in threatening areas. He has a knack for being in the right place at the right time, sniffing out the moment to pounce on a cutback or deflection – quite a rare trait, and one Gundogan has in abundance. With the ball at his feet, he has the ability to take on defenders and find the right space to produce a productive action towards goal.
In 2022-23, compared to Europe’s top five leagues, Veiga ranks in the 99th percentile for non-penalty goals, in the 98th percentile for total shots, in the 96th percentile for shots on target %, and in the 93rd percentile for goals per shot.
When it comes to finding a midfielder to replace Gundogan’s late-runs and goal-scoring ability, Gabri Veiga may just be the answer.
Yet, as good as Veiga is on the goal-scoring front, he has some glaring weaknesses.
The same energy that makes him such a threat going forward goes against him at times. Veiga’s eagerness to get involved often pulls him out of his defensive position, a lack of discipline that isn’t necessarily surprising given his age.
When it comes to passing, his value at Celta Vigo was almost non-existent. For a team that averaged just over 50% possession last season, a center midfielder ranking in the 4th percentile for passes completed and in the 27th percentile for passes into the final third is a worrying sight. Along with these deficiencies, Veiga also lacks an ability to control the tempo of games, most often looking to drive forward rather than pass sideways or backwards – not quite the controlling qualities Pep would look for.
Even with a 6’1” frame that seems well suited to contributing on the defensive end, Veiga’s does not yet have those qualities to show. For reference, he wins less than one tackle and one aerial dual per game. To emulate Gundogan’s late-runner ability is one thing (quite impressive as it is), but to also emulate his defensive capabilities is entirely another thing.
Clearly, Veiga doesn’t seem ready to fill shoes as big as Gundogan’s just yet. At the same time, given how young he is, with sufficient time under Pep and the City staff, it’s easy to imagine him blossoming into a superstar.
While City’s depth in the position is chock full of vibrant attacking options, Veiga’s elite poaching ability, coupled with his frame and versatile potential, makes him a unique profile to add to the mix.
At a time when there doesn’t appear to be an elite attacking #8 on the market, it could be smart to opt for a young “project” to develop into the necessary role (all while having players like Kovacic and Phillips as pragmatic alternatives). If the staff believe that type of player is already part of the club (perhaps Perrone), then the need to spend valuable transfer funds is lessened.
At the same time, City have a lot to spend after winning the treble, so if the funds are available closer to the end of the window, why not add some depth to the squad while investing in a bright young talent?
Two other names who fit this profile well are Oihan Sancet (of Athletic Bilbao) and Jacob Ramsey (of Aston Villa). Three other names who could provide a similar dynamic, though not as holistically as the former three, include Rayan Cherki (of Lyon), Arda Guler (of Fenerbahce) and Xavi Simons (of PSG/PSV).
Jon Mackenzie, of Tifo IRL, suggests a similar approach in this recent video (linked below), naming Florian Wirtz (of Bayer Leverkusen) and Eberechi Eze (of Crystal Palace) as his two primary candidates – two players with a slightly more proven pedigree at the top level than Veiga. Funny enough, statistics site FBref lists Eze as Veiga’s most similar statistical profile.
Whichever path City take in filling Gundogan’s vacancy, there are big decisions to be made. After missing out on the most like-for-like replacement in Alexis MacAllister (who Liverpool snatched up near the beginning of the summer window), failing to offer Gundogan with the contract he desired, and dropping out of the race for Rice, it seems like there must be something we’re all missing from the outside. Surely, Pep, Txiki, and the rest of City’s top figures have a plan, it’s only a matter of time before we understand exactly what that plan is.
With that being said, the plan could simply be: make use of the players already at the club and spend elsewhere. As mentioned earlier, City have seven or eight attack-minded midfielders to utilize in Gundogan’s role, with Phil Foden the prime candidate to transition into more of a full-time midfield role. (We saw this at times throughout the 2022-23 season, though it can be hard to discern that with Gundogan’s 3,500+ minutes in all competitions).
It’s worth asking the question: even if a player of a Gundogan-like profile (like Veiga) signs this summer, will that player be good enough in their first season at City to take a large chunk of minutes? Likely not.
This leaves us with a simple scenario for the left-sided attacking midfielder role: Kovacic takes over about 1,500 minutes (when physical dominance and facilitation is needed), Bernardo occupies a little over 1,000 minutes (when control is needed), and Foden (or Alvarez, Bobb, or McAtee) take over the remaining 1,000 or so minutes (when goal threat is needed).
This solution makes the extension of Bernardo Silva even more crucial than it already is.
(It’s also worth noting, if Bernardo (or Mahrez) leaves, then City should look to sign a winger. Though Bobb is a promising talent who seems ready to take the step to the next level, depth will be needed with Foden spending more time occupying midfield roles.)
With these three key players, City have three distinct specialist profiles for the left-sided attacking midfield role. Dependent on game state and what the opposition offers, Pep has the ability to opt for the distinct profile best suited for the moment at hand. In theory, it should work, though in practice, without a generalist profile like Gundogan, the shortcomings of each alternative could potentially be exploited.
If Bernardo leaves, assuming City fails to sign a “controlling” profile in his place, the gap between City’s defense-minded and attack-minded options grows even wide.
In that case, Foden would likely be tasked with taking over Bernardo’s “controlling” role – a big leap in responsibility many City fans believe he is ready for. I mean, we all saw what he did after subbing on for De Bruyne in the UCL final; and that’s just a glimpse of his potential in that role.
While Foden offers everything you could want and more from either half space in possession, the worry is his defensive capabilities when dropping into a midfield pairing out of possession.
For example, against weaker opposition, fielding a 3-2-4-1 attacking midfield pairing of Foden and De Bruyne is perfectly fine, but against the best opposition, there are defensive deficiencies that arise.
Ideally, you construct a system that allows the team to get the best out of Foden in “Gundogan areas” in possession, while fielding a defensively imposing profile such as Kovacic in the midfield pairing out of possession.
Interestingly, that idea leads right back to the 3-4-3 diamond.
With the 3-4-3 diamond, Foden is allowed to operate through either half space, dictating play from what is almost a free #10 role, in possession. In this role, he can orbit around Haaland, playing off the Norwegian similar to how De Bruyne played off Haaland in certain games last season (such as Arsenal home on April 26, 2023). When Foden drifts into either half space, the center midfielder on the opposite side (Kovacic on the left and Stones on the right) can counter that movement by advancing into the opposite half space, becoming the fifth attacker. In turn, the remaining center midfielder drops alongside Rodri, forming a box midfield.
In City’s out of possession 4-4-2, Foden plays as a second striker alongside Haaland, with Kovacic as the left-sided center midfielder, getting the most out of both player’s off-ball skill sets.
In this way, City can field an XI that allows Foden to flourish, suits Kovacic’s profile and Stones improving attacking abilities, all while constantly morphing between last season’s 3-2-4-1 box midfield and Cruyff’s 3-4-3 diamond midfield.
The same dynamic works if De Bruyne occupies the attacking midfield role instead of Foden.
While Pep will likely opt for a more attacking system in most games, when it comes to big games where City need as much control and pragmatism as possible, this system looks to be a clear solution.
[4. projection]
Of course, City don’t field the same XI or play the same way every game. What works best against Real Madrid is not what works best against Nottingham Forest’s low-block. There is no overarching answer to what City’s tactical system will be under Pep.
Even in the six-and-a-half seasons when a 2-3 build-up was favored, intrasquad dynamics changed constantly. Yet, at the same time, there was a prevalent (and necessary) approach to game state and opposition. “Game state” referring to the context of a given game on the basis of factors such as time, scoreline, and momentum. In analysis, those scenarios can be grouped on the basis of shared qualities (system, approach, favored players, etc.) and assessed individually from that point. It’s by no means the most accurate approach, but it offers a compact overview with a solid depth of understanding.
Certain ideas from the 2022-23 season will persist, of course, such as the overarching ethos of defensive and physical dominance. Many of City’s players (such as Akanji, Dias, Rodri, Grealish, and Haaland) will occupy (more or less) the same roles, but change is always necessary…
Developing certain player’s abilities and finding new roles for them to excel in – for example, Stones playing higher up the pitch and Foden playing in midfield.
Adapting to outgoings and pursuing the right incomings – perhaps above all, making sure everyone in the squad has the right level of desire.
Providing opportunities to younger academy products who fit key rotational needs – such as Bobb and McAtee will be introduced.
Of course, changes will happen in July, August, and throughout the course of the season, but we’re at a point in the summer where the vision of what lies next has begun to formalize.
From the outside, it’s the same idea from the first section, of viewing tactical systems as a set of relationships and observing how those relationships develop over time.
With all that being said, I’ll share my projections for City’s 2023-24 tactical variations (based on groupings of game state and opposition), including depth charts and hypothetical Starting XIs.
MAN CITY’S POTENTIAL 2023-24 TACTICAL SYSTEM(S)
These projections are based on: existing squad, Gundogan and Laporte* departing, Kovacic signing, Gvardiol likely signing, McAtee recall, Bobb call-up, Palmer sale/loan, Perrone loan
Other potential (rumored) departures are marked with an asterisk (*)
(+) = De Bruyne is injured for at least the first few weeks of the season (hamstring)
GROUP 1: “FIRST CHOICE” (PL TOP 6, IMPORTANT UCL GAMES, CUP FINALS)
Generally, against the best opposition, Pep fields a consistent lineup utilizing a multitude of systems. There have been times in the past (such as the 2021 UCL final) when Pep has strayed from these tendencies, but markedly in big games in the second half of last season, Pep remained overwhelmingly consistent.
Of course, the tactical approach of the opposition plays a role, but it is my general expectation that in this type of game, Pep sticks with that approach and consistently opts for a 3-2-4-1/3-4-3 hybrid in possession and a four center-back 4-4-2 out of possession, filled with a physically dominant set of players.
IN POSSESSION: 3-4-3 DIAMOND AND 3-2-4-1
On the left, the sort of physically dominant 3-4-3 diamond or 3-3-4 I would expect against the most potent opposition (think back to City’s structure against Real Madrid and Inter Milan in the UCL semifinals and finals). At the back, Dias anchors with Gvardiol to his left and Akanji to his right. Gvardiol’s assumed left-sided spot will be hotly contested by Ake, while Walker will act as more of a tactical alternative to Akanji. Rodri anchors, with Kovacic and Stones oscillating on either side of him. De Bruyne (or Foden) operates from a free(-ish) attacking midfield role, dictating the tempo of play, while Grealish and Foden (or Bernardo/Mahrez) maintain width and control the flanks. Haaland is, of course, leading the line up top.
On the right, a more attacking alternative in the form of last season’s 3-2-4-1, utilized when City anticipate they have the ability to seize overwhelming control. The dynamic of the backline remains the same, with the usual pairing of Rodri and Stones in front of them. Here, instead of a more defense-oriented option like Kovacic, Foden slides over to the left attacking midfield role and Bernardo comes in on the right flank. Again, this structure is exceptional in attack, but a lot weighs on Foden’s defensive abilities out of possession.
OUT OF POSSESSION: 4-4-2 AND 4-1-4-1
I’ll spare you all on the commentary for the other two out of possession systems, as they all share the same core ideas, but I’d like to stress some key points here:
At the back, as noted across this article, City are well prepared to continue to field a four center-back backline. The addition of Gvardiol would leave the squad with five elite center-backs and only one true full-back. Out of possession, the back four listed in the in-possession section would drop back as follows. There is an argument to be made, however, that City’s best off-ball back four would include both Gvardiol and Ake on the left side, with Dias and Stones on the right.
In midfield, the critical point raised earlier is now fully developed. If a play like Foden takes over Gundogan’s vacancy, City’s out of possession 4-4-2 suffers for it. Rather, a midfield pairing of Kovacic and Rodri leaves City with an incredibly solid foundation.
If Foden is to play in that role, with De Bruyne or Alvarez in the right half space, City ideally drop back into a 4-1-4-1, reminiscent of the 4-3-3 that was popular for so long. The more attacking midfield pairing can then share defensive responsibilities, with Rodri acting as a sort of safety net behind them.
GROUP 2: “GENERAL ROTATION” (MID-TABLE PL, UCL GROUP STAGE, CUP GAMES)
Against average competition, City often stick close to their first-choice XI, with subtle rotation given on the context. Whereas I expect Pep to lean towards a more pragmatic 3-4-3 diamond against the best teams, these games are opportunities for City to field a more attacking, technically focused outfit, favoring the 3-2-4-1 – especially against teams that play a low-block.
IN POSSESSION: 3-4-3 DIAMOND AND 3-2-4-1
On the left, the same 3-4-3 diamond as before, which would be less common against this type of opposition. Certain mid-table Premier League teams such as Aston Villa or Chelsea could prompt Pep to field this sort of system, however, along with using it early on in Kovacic’s development to ease him in. The backline is more or less the same, except for Ake and Gvardiol being closer to 50/50 in these circumstances. The midfield is the same, though one of them could be rotated in any given game, such as Lewis for Stones or Bernardo for Kovacic. In attack, I don’t think it’s crazy to suggest Foden may take over the reins from De Bruyne this season, when it comes to volume. Especially with De Bruyne’s injury, I could see City opting to be very careful with his playing time throughout the year. Other than that, Mahrez becomes more of a steady option on the right flank and the rest is the same.
On the right, the 3-2-4-1 we are more likely to see against such opposition. When City are facing lesser opposition, they can afford to play with a strong front-five. As well, this group of opposition features a good amount of low-block teams, for which City will almost certainly deploy this system. The backline remains the same, though Gvardiol’s on-ball ability puts him as a slight favorite over Ake. The midfield pivot is as usual, with a very familiar front-five in front of them. Not much needs to be said here, it’s pretty standard business for City.
OUT OF POSSESSION: 4-4-2 AND 4-1-4-1
GROUP 3: “MASS ROTATION” (PL BOTTOM 6, EASY CUP GAMES)
Whenever City face a bottom-six team in the league, there’s clamor about how much rotation will occur. Even though no game is a given throughout the season, City’s grueling schedule forces Pep and the squad to consistently rotate, taking advantage of opportunities such as this. Of course, not everyone rotates at once (as the graphics below may suggest), but Pep can often rotate six to eight players against this type of opposition. Similarly, there may come a time like the end of the 2022-23 UCL group stage and Premier League season, when City play a game that is virtually meaningless.
The following “depth charts” are more so representative of City’s second-choice figure in each position than acting as a hypothetical lineup for these scenarios.
IN POSSESSION: 3-4-3 DIAMOND AND 3-2-4-1
There’s not much to tactically discern in general here, so I’ll speak on both simultaneously:
In goal, Stefan Ortega has proven to be a very worthy backup for Ederson, so we’ll certainly see him get his fair share of playing time next season.
At the back, the status is more or less the same as last season, with Walker’s future at City hanging in the balance. If he decides to depart, City will need to replace him (perhaps with a figure like Benjamin Pavard, of Bayern Munich, or Aaron Wan-Bissaka, of Man United).
In midfield, Stones and Rodri have direct replacements in Lewis and Phillips, which is a great sign for City’s core flexibility. Further up, Sergio Gomez and James McAtee will both look to take hold of any opportunities that come their way. McAtee had an exceptional campaign in the Championship last season with Sheffield United, so it will be interesting to see if he can develop into a prominent supporting figure for City.
In attack, Julian Alvarez obviously deputizes for Erling Haaland. That leaves Oscar Bobb (who I cheekily gave the #7 to in my graphic) as the final man to talk about; and if you aren’t aware of him already, you should do yourself a favor and watch him in the ongoing U-21 Euro’s with Norway. He is a City academy product (named EDS Player of the Season in 2022-23 for the second time running), capable of playing anywhere across City’s attacking-four in the 3-2-4-1 (similar to Foden). Bobb has mind-blowing technical ability and decision-making, words simply don’t do his game justice. Long story short, City have an attacker with the ceiling to become one of the best attacking players in the Premier League, so witnessing his development in City’s first team this season should be a joy to watch.
OUT OF POSSESSION: 4-4-2 AND 4-1-4-1
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
As the summer ticks away and we move closer to the start of the 2023-24 season, the view of City’s plans will come more and more into focus. Even then, with where we’re at right now, we have a strong indication of where the squad is headed; and accordingly, how Pep will manage that squad tactically.
Overall, we should see Pep and City stick to the physically-oriented core which sparked last season’s treble-winning dominance; the additions of Mateo Kovacic and (hopefully) Josko Gvardiol signal that.
In defense, the dynamic should remain more or less the same, perhaps with greater tactical flexibility on the left side thanks to Gvardiol’s technical ability. John Stones and Rico Lewis should both steadily improve, allowing Pep to play them even further up the pitch in possession. The big question is the status of Kyle Walker, who has reported interest from Bayern Munich. If he departs, City will need to buy a replacement and Pep will need to tactically adapt in big matches that require a pacey defender on the right.
In possession, City’s 3-2-4-1 should develop into a 3-4-3 diamond in key moments. The departure of Ilkay Gundogan leaves a sizeable void in City’s left half space, which Kovacic and Phil Foden will look to fill in. However, their profiles don’t necessarily support a balanced 3-2-4-1 all the time, which may lead Pep to transition the box midfield into more of a diamond. In a 3-4-3 diamond, Kovacic is able to play a more comfortable role off the left of the diamond, with Foden or De Bruyne gaining agency at the head of the diamond.
In games against lesser opposition, Pep and City can stick with the 3-2-4-1, fielding a pair of two attack-minded midfielders in the half spaces.
In attack, the dynamic is more or less the same from last season, unless one of Bernardo Silva or Riyad Mahrez depart. Erling Haaland will continue to flourish through the center, Jack Grealish will hold down the left, and a mix of Bernardo, Foden, and Mahrez will pose attacking threat from the right. Not to mention the promising addition of academy product Oscar Bobb into the squad.
All-in-all, City’s squad is well structured to once again be front-runners in every competition, with some exciting signings, prospects, and tactical developments on the road ahead.
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